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Abstract 
The paper compares the social mobility and status attainment of first and second-generation 
Turkish migrants with those of natives in nine European destination countries and with Turks 
in Turkey. The widely used assimilationist approach is complemented by a focus on the benefits 
(and limitations) of migration, not only in terms of average achievements with respect to those 
left behind, but also in terms of the possibilities for social mobility. Based on a combined dataset 
from the European Social Survey (2002-2010) and the European Values Study (2008), the study 
shows that the children of low class Turkish migrants are more likely to acquire a higher 
education than their counterparts in Turkey, making them more educationally mobile. 
Moreover, they are able to use this education in the Western European labour market, an 
improvement over the first generation Turks. When comparing labour market outcomes of 
second generation Turks with respect to Turks in Turkey, the results show that the same 
education leads to a higher occupational status in Turkey, making the occupational ‘gains’ that 
second generation Turks obtain in Western Europe transform into ‘lags’ with respect to those 
left behind. Overall, however, the higher social mobility of second generation Turks represents 
a positive outcome of the migration project in terms of possibilities of leaving an unprivileged 
context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 1960s and the early 1970s, facilitated by labour import contracts, a number of Western 
European industries hired Turkish workers. Although migration of Turks was intended to be 
temporary and contracts were phased out after 1974, many labour migrants stayed, their 
numbers subsequently bolstered by family reunification and chain migration. Turkish origin 
residents are now the largest extra-communitarian migrant group in Western Europe. 
Much of the research on first and second generation migrants in Europe concerns the 
integration of the Turkish origin population in destination societies. Such studies centre on 
educational and labour market achievements of migrants, in comparison to natives and/or other 
migrant groups (Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado 2007; Crul and Vermeulen 2003 and related 
articles from the same journal issue; Euwals, et al. 2007; Heath and Cheung 2007; Heath, 
Rothon and Kilpi 2008; Kogan 2011; Kristen and Granato 2007; Phalet and Heath 2010; Van 
De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen 2007). However, this may not be the perspective that migrants 
themselves find most relevant. People do not move to compete with other groups in the 
destination society but to improve their life chances – and their children’s – relative to what they 
would have been in the origin society. In other words, to understand international migration and 
its effects on those building a life abroad, we must consider social origins. In this paper we do 
so in two different but equally important ways. First, we compare individuals to their parents by 
studying intergenerational mobility (or the reverse: intergenerational reproduction) in both 
education and occupation. Second, we compare Turks who migrated to Western Europe and this 
group’s second generation to those who stayed in the origin country, Turkey. This latter 
perspective leads to a counterfactual view of the outcomes of migration: what would the 
occupational status of first generation Turks, along with the educational and occupational status 
of their descendants, be had they not migrated to Western Europe?  
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The overwhelming majority of studies compare migrants and their offspring to natives 
or to other migrant groups in the destination countries; they trace different forms of assimilation 
(Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Zhou 1993) and note how ‘ethnic penalties’ (Heath and Cheung 
2007) evolve over time and over generations. By way of contrast, our original country-of-origin 
perspective reveals the benefits (or pitfalls) of migrating in terms of achievements and 
possibilities for upward social mobility compared to those left behind. We study status 
attainment and social mobility (or social reproduction) processes among Turks in Turkey, first 
and second generation Turks in Western Europe, and Western European natives, asking the 
following research questions: To what extent are social reproduction patterns different for Turks 
in Western Europe, Turks in Turkey and natives in destination countries? What do these 
differences suggest in terms of how groups are doing in comparative terms, especially how 
Turks in Europe are doing with respect to Turks in Turkey?  
The analysis draws on a dataset combining the European Social Survey (2002-2010) and 
European Values Study (2008); data cover Turks in their most common Western European 
destinations and in Turkey.  
 
TURKS IN WESTERN EUROPE 
Social and economic development in Western Europe and Turkey made these two areas into 
receiving and sending migration regions, respectively, in the early 1960s. While Western 
Europe’s economic growth after World War II created a need for a low-skilled labour force, its 
educational expansion decreased the number of low-skilled job seekers. Lacking spontaneous 
migration from former colonies and with increasing job vacancies in manufacturing, mining, 
construction and the service industry, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and 
Sweden (countries with the largest Turkish population) looked for new sources of manpower. 
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A ‘guest worker’ system was introduced, consisting of formal labour import agreements 
between these countries and Turkey (Akgündüz 2008).  
At the same time, Turkey was transforming. Between the founding years of the Turkish 
Republic and the 1960s, Turkey witnessed a dramatic population growth, provoking mass 
movements from rural to urban areas (Kocaman 2008). Urbanization had increased by 17% in 
1935, 42% in 1975 and 70% in 2011 (Karadayi 1974; UNDP 2013). Yet Turkey failed to 
implement large-scale industrialization; unemployment became an issue, together with other 
social and economic problems, such as big-city ghettos, segregation and poverty (Kıray 1982). 
The ‘excess labour’ – including workers in agriculture and artisans – had to choose between 
becoming part of the impoverished urban poor or finding another way to maintain their income 
and wellbeing. Temporary migration to Western Europe appeared a good solution; it even 
became an option for the urban middle class and low-ranking government officials (Akgündüz 
2008).  
After labour import contracts ended in 1974, Turks continued to migrate to Western 
Europe, mainly through family reunion and chain migration. In 1973, the number in Western 
Europe totalled 1.35 million, of whom 900,000 were workers and 450,000 dependants. In spite 
of return flows, the Turkish population in Western Europe rose to about 2 million in 1980, 3 
million in 2006, and now stands at 4 million (Abadan-Unat 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Turkey 2012; UNDP 2013). As this is based on figures that only include Turkish citizens, 
there are likely many more persons of Turkish descent. Of the countries cited above, the majority 
reside in Germany, with substantial numbers in France and the Netherlands and sizeable groups 
in other Western European countries.  
 
 
  
5 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Introduction 
Practically from the beginning of migration studies, a concern for scholars has been how 
migrants and their descendants are doing with respect to native or majoritarian populations in 
destination countries. This concern led to the development of assimilation and segmented 
assimilation theories (Alba and Nee 1997; Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 
1997), which seek to explain why migrants integrate – or not – into the host society and why 
they acquire – or not – the same opportunities as the native population  over time. The concept 
of ‘ethnic penalties’ emerged as part of this debate in the European context. It refers to the 
difference remaining in outcomes between migrants and native populations after background 
characteristics are taken into account (Heath and Cheung 2007; Phalet and Heath 2010).  
We take a somewhat different approach; for a comprehensive view of the outcomes of 
migration, we need to compare migrants and their children with those left behind (Guveli, et al. 
2015). With the exception of studies related to the ‘selection of migrants’ (Borjas 1987; 
Dronkers and De Heus 2009; Feliciano 2005) or to earnings (see Massey et al. 1993 for a 
review), the literature has barely scratched the surface of this issue.  
People usually move in search of a better life, specifically when opportunities in 
destination societies seem better than those at home (or gains are higher than costs) (Sjaastad 
1962). It is to be expected, therefore, that migration is usually beneficial for social mobility and 
career advancement. In fact, one of the main objectives of labour migrants is to improve their 
own and, more importantly, their children’s life prospects in comparison to those left behind.1 
                                                 
1 ‘Left behind’ refers to Turks in Turkey, including those living in rural areas and those in cities (which include 
those who used to live in rural areas but migrated to urban centres: according to UN statistics, urbanization 
increased from 42% in 1975 to 73% in 2014). It includes ethnic minorities, such as Kurds, as well. We ran tests 
(available upon request) showing that comparing Turks in Europe and Turks in Turkey leads to similar results, 
independently of location and ethnic belonging. Note, however, that – by including social origins in our analysis, 
a key assumption is that Turks in Europe compare themselves with Turks in Turkey with similar socio-economic 
backgrounds.   
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This, in many cases, presupposes a wish for intergenerational improvement, whereby children 
are better off than their parents. 
In what follows, we study educational and occupational attainment, as well as processes 
of social mobility, for four groups: first generation Turks, that is, Turks born and mostly 
educated in Turkey who migrated to Western Europe; second generation Turks, that is, Turks 
born or mostly educated in Western Europe; Turks in Turkey; natives in Western Europe. 
 
Migrants and OED model 
To study status attainment and social mobility, we use the OED (Origin-Education-Destination) 
model, initially developed by Blau and Duncan (1967). This model also serves as a guide for 
our hypotheses. The OED model (see Figure 1a) follows two forms of reproduction: education 
and occupation. On the one hand, social origins affect education: parents influence their children 
by helping them with their homework, sending them to better schools or paying for extra-
curricular help (OE). On the other hand, social origins affect occupation (destination) both 
directly and indirectly. In the latter indirect effect, high status families more successfully 
position their children in higher education than low status families (OE), and education has a 
value in the labour market, influencing occupational outcomes (ED). In the former, social 
origins directly affect occupation (OD) in a number of ways: parents influence their children by 
giving them job advice, helping them look for a job, providing economic resources (including 
the transmission of a family business), transferring ability and cognitive skills, offering social 
and relational aptitudes and supplying a wide range of networks and connections.  
We assume each of the three main components of the OED model may play out 
differently for each group we consider. This is expressed in arrows A1-A3 in Figures 1b and 1c; 
these include the group variable (G): Turks in Turkey, first and second generation Turks and 
Western European natives. We expect to find different social reproduction patterns among the 
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groups. Arrow A1 in Figure 1b expresses differences in educational reproduction (OE); arrow 
A2 in Figure 1c expresses differences in the direct effect of parental background on occupation 
(OD); arrow A3 expresses differences in returns to education (ED). 
 
 
Figure 1b and 1c also show ‘average group effects’ for education (GE) and occupation 
(GD), that is, differences created because of specific characteristics of the groups (or processes 
deriving from those characteristics). In the literature comparing migrants with native 
populations, these average group effects are usually referred to ‘ethnic penalties’ (i.e., to the 
detriment of the migrants). These ‘unexplained differences’ between groups are often attributed 
to discrimination (Heath and Cheung 2006; Wrench and Modood 2000), but other possible 
factors include cultural values, lack of networks, poor language skills, etc. In our analysis, 
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‘average groups effects’  might also refer to differences between migrants and Turks in Turkey: 
for example, those who leave may be more motivated and risk-taking than those who stay, 
giving them a gross advantage in destination countries over those left behind. An important 
characteristic of our model is that by assuming differences in social reproduction across groups, 
we may find these ‘unexplained differences’ actually occur only (or to a greater/lesser extent) 
for some educational levels or certain social backgrounds, indicating the existence of varied 
explanatory mechanisms. This is better understood with an example. Looking at the UK, some 
studies (Platt 2007; Zuccotti 2015a) find Caribbeans with lower class backgrounds are less 
penalized in the labour market than those with higher class backgrounds. This might suggest, 
for example, that discrimination based on skin colour – an ‘average effect’ – does not serve as 
an explanatory mechanism; in addition, Caribbeans with higher class parental backgrounds may 
lack specific ‘high class resources’ (ways of behaving and talking, social networks, etc.) 
necessary to achieve certain qualified occupations.  
By following the OED model, we look at differences between groups by studying 
processes of social reproduction: we explore how OE, ED and OD relationships vary for each 
group and how this affects average differences between Turks in Europe and Turks in 
Turkey/European natives.  
 
Mechanisms and hypotheses 
In what follows, we use the OED model to derive our hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 refers to first 
generation Turks and discusses only occupational outcomes; hypotheses 2a and 2b refer to 
second generation Turks and discuss both educational and occupational outcomes. A summary 
of all hypotheses appears in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Hypotheses 
Generation Outcome studied Hypothesis 
First Occupation 
1. Weaker effect of parental background (OD) 
and lower returns to education (ED) compared 
to Turks in Turkey and WE natives 
Second 
Education 
2.a. Weaker effect of parental background 
(OE) compared to Turks in Turkey and WE 
natives 
Occupation 
2.b.Weaker effect of parental background 
(OD) compared to Turks in Turkey and WE 
natives 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 (first generation) 
Our first expectation is that social reproduction with respect to the occupational status of first 
generation Turks will differ from that of Turks in Turkey and Western European (WE) natives 
in two respects. First, we expect parents of the former to be less influential (OD) than the parents 
of the latter two; second, we expect migrants to have lower returns to education (ED), that is, 
higher educational levels give them less occupational status. 
We expect a weaker effect of parental background on occupations (OD) for migrants 
because when migrating, first generation migrants leave their parents behind, and with them, 
resources affecting their occupations. As for the relationship between education and labour 
market outcomes (ED), the literature consistently shows the educational qualifications of 
international migrants are not always recognized; hence, they do not have the same effect on 
occupational outcomes as they do for individuals seeking jobs in their own country (Algan, et 
al. 2010; Chiswick and Miller 2007; Heath and Cheung 2007; Johnston, et al. 2010; Kalter, 
Granato and Kristen 2007; Kogan 2006; Van Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004).  
How first generation Turks do with respect to Turks in Turkey will depend on the 
differences in the role of education and parental background in Western Europe and Turkey. 
For example, although depending less on parental resources might be detrimental for migrants 
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whose parents have high social backgrounds, it might be better for those who have left their 
lower social class parental backgrounds behind, as is the case for most first generation migrant 
Turks. As regards the role of education, the match between educational credentials and labour 
market will probably be less for first generation Turks with a Turkish diploma looking for a job 
in the Western European labour market than for Turks searching for a job in Turkey. While in 
terms of income and employment, migrants may find better chances outside their home country, 
a weaker match between education and occupation might give an overall advantage to Turks in 
Turkey, especially among those with higher educational levels. Finally, we need to consider 
unmeasured factors, for example, discrimination in the Western European labour market, which 
might give an overall advantage to Turks in Turkey; or a very high motivation among migrants, 
which might give an overall advantage to Turks in Western Europe.  
 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b (second generation) 
There is much debate about the fortunes of the children of migrants. Although some studies say 
disadvantages might persist over generations (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997) or social 
mobility might be ‘blocked’ (Pichler 2011), others expect an improvement over time; more 
importantly, the children of migrants are likely to do better than their parents (Alba and Nee 
1997; Alba and Nee 2003), especially when arriving parents have low social backgrounds 
(Zhou, et al. 2008), as in the Turkish case.  
We hypothesize the children of Turks will not only do better than their parents but will 
be less dependent on them in terms of education and occupation than Turks in Turkey (and, 
presumably, natives in Western Europe). We expect to find lower social reproduction levels for 
Turks in Western Europe than for Turks in Turkey; we expect these to be mainly the product of 
higher educational mobility (weaker OE) (hypothesis 2a) and, to a lesser extent, of a weaker 
direct effect of parental occupation on individuals’ occupation (OD) (hypothesis 2b). 
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Furthermore, as a consequence of hypothesis 2a, we expect second generation Turks to be in a 
better position than those left behind in terms of education.  
Migrants want better lives for their children and will invest in them (Dustmann 2008). 
In fact, there is evidence of educational mobility among second generation migrants (see Heath, 
Rothon and Kilpi 2008 for a review). A German study shows the influence of the father’s 
education on the chances of children reaching the Abitur is smaller for second generation Turks 
than for natives (Kristen and Granato 2007). While this implies a higher parental education is 
less of an advantage for Turks than for natives, it also suggests a low starting point – common 
among the descendants of Turkish migrants – might not be as detrimental for Turks.  
Motivation and high parental aspirations are often used to explain educational mobility 
among ethnic minorities (Heath, Rothon and Kilpi 2008);  there is evidence that the parents of 
second generation Turks have particularly high aspirations for their children (Abadan-Unat 
2011). If so, a lower dependence on the (usually low) parental background among Turks in 
Western Europe means better educational outcomes compared to those left behind. A recent 
study shows Turkish children in Europe perform better (higher PISA test scores) than children 
in Turkey, given equal parental backgrounds (Dustmann, Frattini and Lanzara 2012).  
Regarding occupational outcomes, the OED model shows the parental effect on 
occupation is mediated by the role of education: for second generation Turks, and in line with 
previous findings on social mobility of ethnic minorities (see for example Platt 2007; Zuccotti 
2015a), we expect education attainment to be the main channel for social mobility. However, 
we also suggest the parental pressure to do well in the destination country might be expressed 
in the direct encouragement to find a good job and progress in a career; this will be reflected in 
a weaker direct effect of (the relatively low) parental class on children’s occupations (OD). 
Although entrepreneurship among Turks might be a way to keep the relationship between 
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parents and children strong, the number of entrepreneurial parents in our sample is small 
compared to the number in manual jobs.   
In determining how well Turks in Western Europe do compared to those left behind in 
terms of occupation, if educational mobility is higher for the former, and this is, in turn, 
translated into better positions in the labour market, Turks in Europe will probably be 
advantaged (especially those with lower social backgrounds). However, if ‘ethnic penalties’ are 
present for the second generation – expressed, for example, in discrimination – this might 
moderate the (expected) advantage over those left behind. The low performance for second 
generation migrants is acknowledged by studies exploring access to higher status jobs (Crul and 
Doomernik 2003; Heath and Cheung 2007; Heath, Rothon and Kilpi 2008; Kogan 2006; 
Silberman, Alba and Fournier 2007; Simon 2003). Yet most do not consider parental 
background in their models, generating a possible bias in their conclusions, as in the UK case 
(Zuccotti 2015a).  
 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
Our analysis uses the European Social Survey (ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010) and one 
round of the European Values Study (EVS 2008). Taken together, these six surveys cover almost 
all European populations and Turkey, making it possible to compare Turkish migrants (and their 
descendants), Turkish non-migrants and Western European natives. While primarily social 
attitudes surveys, ESS and EVS stand out for their detailed inventory of migration status, with 
questions on country of birth of respondents and their parents, period of arrival, nationality and 
language spoken at home. Both have relatively good information on parents’ educations and 
occupations and respondents’ corresponding status. There are minor differences in how data are 
collected and processed, both between ESS and EVS and between ESS rounds.  
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Our four main comparison groups are: Turks in Turkey; Turks in Western Europe, 
comprising first generation (born and mostly educated in Turkey) and second generation (born 
or mostly educated in Western Europe); natives in Western Europe. For ESS 2004, 2006, 2008 
and 2010 and EVS, we consider Turks as those individuals interviewed in Western Europe who 
were born in Turkey, or have at least one parent born in Turkey (more than 90% have two 
parents born in Turkey) or have Turkish citizenship. For ESS 2002, we define Turks as those 
who speak Turkish as a first or second language, are Turkish citizens or were born in Turkey. 
ESS 2002 only asks for the continent of birth for parents, an ambiguous measure, as 12% of 
Turks live in the European part of Turkey. Western European natives and Turks in Turkey are 
those who, along with their parents, were born in one of the Western European countries in our 
sample or in Turkey, respectively. We restrict our analysis to nine countries where Turkish 
migrants are found by ESS or EVS: Germany, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. We exclude Bulgaria and Greece because persons 
of Turkish descent in these countries are generally not labour migrants; we exclude Luxembourg 
because it has few Turks. All countries are available in both surveys and all rounds, except 
Austria, which is not available in ESS 2008 and 2010, and Turkey, which is not available in 
ESS 2002, 2006 and 2010. Information on the total number of respondents per survey/round 
and country appears in Table S1, in the online version of this article. 
Although ESS and EVS are part of large-scale projects with standardized procedures for 
collecting data, for which comparability is respected, a possible weakness is the representation 
of migrants, including Turks. For example, as questionnaires are only in the language of the 
country, less educated and more recent migrants may be underrepresented in the sample. Three 
comments on this: first, although we are studying first and second generations, the crucial 
comparisons are with the latter group, as their outcomes express longer-term processes of 
integration and are more interesting when compared to Western European natives and Turks in 
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Turkey. Second, even if only the better-off Turks (in terms of education and occupation) are 
present in the sample, we are making use of a crucial variable to control for this: parental 
background. Finally, our results go in the same direction as those of a previous cross-national 
study on ‘ethnic penalties’ (Heath and Cheung 2007). Specifically, when looking at access to 
managerial and professional occupations (I and II in the EGP class scheme)2 for second 
generation Turks and Western European natives (only in ESS rounds) and controlling for age 
and education, we find a negative effect – or ‘ethnic penalty’ – for second generation Turks 
compared to natives. 
Our criterion for defining first and second generation Turks is place of education. We 
use a ‘majority’ rule whereby individuals are assigned to the first generation if they were born 
and completed most of their education (>50%) in Turkey and to the second generation if they 
were born or mostly educated in Western Europe. For individuals born in Turkey, the 
differentiation between first and second generations uses the person’s age, age of arrival in the 
destination country, and estimated age when education was finished. We approximate the years 
of education necessary to finish a certain educational level, assuming individuals enter the 
educational system at age six.3 For example, a person who finished upper secondary education 
(around age 18) and emigrated at age 15 is considered to have done most of his/her studies in 
Turkey but if emigrating at age 10 is considered to have done the majority in Western Europe. 
This variable is easily constructed in ESS 2010 and EVS, as they collect the precise age of 
arrival. For other rounds, the variable was approximated.4 
                                                 
2 We created the service class using syntax in: http://www.harryganzeboom.nl/isco88/index.htm. 
3 Following UNESCO (2006) age limits are: not completed primary education (6-9 years old); primary education 
or first stage of basic education (6-12 years old); lower secondary or second stage of basic education (6-15 years 
old); (upper) secondary education (6-18 years old); post-secondary non-tertiary education (6-20 years old); first 
stage of tertiary education (6-22 years old); second stage of tertiary education (6-26 years old). When ISCED is 
missing, we use the declared years of education. 
4 Instead of the exact variable, we use crude categories: arrived last year; between 1 and 5 years; between 6 and 
10 years; between 11 and 20 years; and 21 years and more. For the first two categories, we assume education was 
mostly done in Turkey. For the latter three, we approximate the likelihood of having finished more than 50% of 
education in the country of destination by creating a continuous variable running from 0 to 1. Consider a 23-year 
old person with primary education who emigrated between 11 and 20 years ago. This person studied between the 
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Table 2 shows the distribution of the four comparison groups by survey/year and 
destination country. The proportion of first and second generation Turks is similar in all data 
sources. Note: although our respondents are disproportionately situated in Germany, Turks in 
Germany are underrepresented (when compared to Turkish figures);5 this is the logical 
consequence of the ESS sampling design. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of comparison groups by survey/round and country (%). Population 
18-65* 
 Turks in Turkey Turk 1st Turk 2nd  WE Natives 
Survey/round     
ESS1 0.0 18.4 16.5 19.7 
ESS2 29.4 18.8 19.9 19.0 
ESS3 0.0 16.7 18.2 18.8 
ESS4 35.3 17.5 15.2 15.4 
ESS5 0.0 15.8 18.9 14.4 
EVS 35.3 12.8 11.4 12.8 
Country     
Austria 0.0 8.5 13.1 8.7 
Belgium 0.0 9.4 10.4 10.2 
Switzerland 0.0 18.4 10.1 8.8 
Germany 0.0 26.9 36.0 16.5 
Denmark 0.0 6.8 5.4 10.8 
France 0.0 2.6 4.0 10.6 
Netherlands 0.0 15.4 14.5 12.1 
Norway 0.0 4.7 1.3 11.7 
Sweden 0.0 7.3 5.1 10.7 
Turkey 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 2198 234 297 55329 
* The sample is restricted to individuals with valid ISEI, education and parents’ ISEI. 
 
 
                                                 
ages of 6 and 13 and arrived in Western Europe between the ages of 3 and 12 (approximate values). In total, 
primary studies take around 7 years. If the person emigrated at 10, 11 or 12 years old, we assume he/she completed 
most education in Turkey (at least 4 years out of 7). If the person emigrated at 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9 years old, we 
consider most studies were completed in Western Europe. S/he receives a value of 7/10 (or 0.7): in 7 out of the 10 
possible ages of arrival, s/he did most of his/her education in Western Europe. This continuous variable is later 
dichotomized: those with values up to 0.5 are assigned to the first generation, those higher than 0.5 to the second 
generation (around 30% of all Turks have intermediate values). 
5 Ministry of Labour and Social Security (Abadan-Unat 2011). 
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The time of arrival is a key piece of information. The vast majority of the first generation 
Turks in our data (around 70%) arrived in 1980 or later, probably migrating as part of family 
reunion or chain migration processes. Among second generation Turks born in Turkey rather 
than the destination country (36%), around 78% arrived before 1980, thus living more than 20 
years in the destination country.6  
Respondents and their parents’ educational qualifications are measured with the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97), which ranges from 0 
(incomplete primary) to 6 (postgraduate level of tertiary education). We scale these into 
approximate years of education7 and replace the missing cases with the declared years of 
education completed (for respondents only). We prefer qualifications scaled by duration over 
stated duration, following Hout and DiPrete (2006). In EVS, only the father’s education is 
collected, except for households headed by single mothers. For parents in ESS, we consider the 
maximum value of father and mother. In all surveys, the reference time for parental information 
(and occupation) is when the respondent is 14 years old.  
Respondents’ occupations (current or last) are measured with the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), available for all countries and years: these have been 
transformed into the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom and Treiman 
1996), which varies between 16 and 90. For parental occupations, in EVS the respondent is 
asked about the father’s occupation (for single mother households, the mother’s occupation) and 
in ESS, both the father and mother’s occupation. In all surveys, ISCO codes are available for 
most cases, but ESS also has crude self-classification scores, which are converted into their 
approximate ISCO equivalent. For ESS, we convert both detailed ISCO and crude measures 
                                                 
6 Values refer to individuals with valid ISEI, education and parents’ ISEI.  
7 Not completed primary education (3.25 years); primary education or first stage of basic education (6.5 years); 
lower secondary or second stage of basic education (9.5 years); (upper) secondary education (13 years); post-
secondary non-tertiary education (14.25); first stage of tertiary education (16.5 years); second stage of tertiary 
education (20.5 years).  
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into ISEI scores (for father and mother); we then take the average between both ISEI versions 
(for father and mother); finally, we consider the maximum value between both parents. 
Analysis is based on OLS regressions, with separate models for men and women. 
Educational attainment covers people between 25 and 65, while occupational attainment covers 
those from 18 to 65. We exclude those older than 65, given the very few older Turks in Western 
Europe. 
 
ANALYSIS 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables broken down by comparison group and 
gender. Parental education and occupational status are higher for first generation Turks than 
those who stayed behind; this also applies to their education. These values point to a positive 
selection of Turks in Western Europe. As for occupational status, despite differences in 
education and parental backgrounds favouring migrants, first generation Turks have either 
similar (men) or lower (women) occupational status than their counterparts in Turkey. Unlike 
Turks in Turkey, the first generation maintain the level of their parents’ occupational statuses. 
Finally, we observe an important gap in ISEI when comparing them to natives in Western 
Europe, as most previous literature has shown. 
Table 3 reveals second generation Turks have clearly moved up the educational 
hierarchy relative to those left behind and to their parents but have not quite reached the level 
of Western European natives. For occupational status, second generation Turks are collectively 
quite mobile relative to their parents and are approaching (but not quite reaching) the level of 
Western European natives. Despite their higher levels of education, the occupational status of 
second generation male Turks is only slightly higher than those left behind, while the women 
have even lower status than their compatriots at home. Note: in Turkey, the number of women 
with a valid ISEI score – implying they are either currently employed or have been in the past 
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– is much smaller (N=658). While in Turkey, more than 70% of women have never worked (or 
do not declare so in this survey), in Western Europe, this drops to around 18% for second 
generation Turkish women. In addition, lower educated women are most likely to be out of the 
labour market in Turkey (figure available upon request).  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics by comparison group and gender (means) 
 Men    Women    
 
Turks in 
Turkey 
Turks 
1st 
Turks 
2nd  
WE 
Natives 
Turks in 
Turkey 
Turks 
1st 
Turks 
2nd  
WE 
Natives 
Parents’ education 6.4 7.9 9.2 11.6 6.2 8.5 8.7 11.5 
Education 9.5 10.7 12.3 13.6 7.9 10.2 11.9 13.4 
Parents’ ISEI 30.8 34.3 33.8 43.7 33.1 33.6 32.4 43.5 
ISEI 36.3 35.8 38.1 46.0 42.0 31.8 39.9 44.6 
Age 39.1 41.2 31.1 43.4 34.9 39.3 29.5 43.5 
Total 25-60* 1549 152 123 24685 1963 100 88 25796 
Total 18-60** 1540 154 170 27273 658 80 127 28050 
Total 18-60*** 1890 162 190 28605 2382 110 155 29606 
* Total population 25-60 with valid education and parents’ education & ISEI (total for the first two percentage 
rows) 
** Total population 18-60 with valid education, ISEI and parents’ ISEI (total for the last three percentage rows) 
*** Total population 18-60 with valid education and parents’ ISEI  
 
 
Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the regression models for education and occupation 
for the four comparison groups, differentiated by gender. The age of the respondent is set at 35; 
the independent variables (parents’ education and occupation, respondents’ education) are 
standardized into z-scores so they have equal standard deviations, making the coefficients 
comparable across equations.8 All models control for survey/year dummies (not shown). 
Although we are interested in the average situation of Turks in Western Europe, we explore 
country effects by adding country dummies (see Tables S2 and S3). The models with country 
dummies are very similar to the ones presented below.9 For the purposes of this paper and ease 
                                                 
8 Although group distributions are different, the results are the same with non-standardized coefficients. 
9 We find some country differences. Regarding educational outcomes, only the Austrian case is different from the 
rest: here second generation Turks do not seem to gain an educational advantage over those left behind. The results 
on occupational attainment show Turks in Germany (especially the first generation) are particularly disadvantaged 
  
19 
of interpretation, we discuss the tables without country dummies. Finally, Figures 2a-3b add 
graphical evidence to key findings in Tables 4 and 5: Figures 2a and 2b show educational 
mobility for the various groups (based on Models 3a and 3b from Table 4); Figures 3a and 3b 
show returns to education (based on Models 4a and 4b from Table 5). 10 
 
Table 4: Education (years) by comparison group (ref.=Turks in Turkey), parents’ education 
(PEDUC), parents’ ISEI (PISEI) and age1 (men and women 25-65). Models control for 
survey/round2. 
 Men Women 
  Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b 
Constant  9.74 11.46 12.55 8.40 10.18 11.52 
 (0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.14)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.13)*** 
Turks 1st 1.40 0.80 0.28 2.47 1.68 0.41 
 (0.27)*** (0.24)*** (0.34) (0.32)*** (0.29)*** (0.36) 
Turks 2nd 2.77 2.00 0.40 3.70 3.11 1.98 
 (0.30)*** (0.27)*** (0.32) (0.34)*** (0.31)*** (0.37)*** 
WE Natives 4.45 2.25 1.14 6.07 3.91 2.57 
 (0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.14)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.13)*** 
PEDUC  1.30 2.23  1.24 2.31 
  (0.02)*** (0.09)***  (0.02)*** (0.09)*** 
Turk 1st * PEDUC   -0.23   -0.98 
   (0.27)   (0.28)*** 
Turk 2nd * PEDUC   -1.91   -0.74 
   (0.28)***   (0.31)** 
WE Natives * PEDUC   -0.97   -1.13 
   (0.10)***   (0.09)*** 
PISEI  0.40 0.40  0.44 0.40 
  (0.02)*** (0.02)***  (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
Age -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
       
Adj. R2 0.11 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.36 0.37 
N 26509 26509 26509 27947 27947 27947 
1 The values are B-coefficients (SE) from OLS regressions. PEDUC and PISEI are z-scores and AGE centered at 
35. *** p-value<0.01 ** p-value<0.05 * p-value<0.10 
2 The constant refers to Turks in Turkey in EVS. 
 
                                                 
in terms of occupational status compared to Turks in Turkey; the opposite is observed in Austria and The 
Netherlands. 
10 Predicted values in Figures 2a-3b refer to individuals who are 35 years old; variables not observed in the figures 
are set to the mean. To construct the figures, we use margins and marginsplot commands in STATA (version 12.1). 
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Table 5: Occupation (ISEI) by comparison group (ref.=Turks in Turkey), education (PEDUC), parents’ ISEI (PISEI) and age1 
(men and women 18-65). Models control for survey/round2. 
 Men Women 
  Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b 
Constant 35.63 45.42 40.52 44.34 41.76 47.94 45.45 48.08 
 (0.46)*** (0.40)*** (0.59)*** (0.55)*** (0.65)*** (0.56)*** (0.76)*** (0.70)*** 
Turk 1st -0.52 -3.57 -2.35 -4.32 -10.21 -11.03 -11.26 -13.05 
 (1.38) (1.16)*** (1.55) (1.49)*** (1.89)*** (1.63)*** (2.15)*** (2.02)*** 
Turk 2nd 3.07 -2.05 0.40 -2.70 -2.08 -3.40 -3.32 -5.17 
 (1.32)** (1.11)* (1.59) (1.45)* (1.55) (1.33)** (1.98)* (1.82)*** 
WE Natives 9.36 -2.65 4.10 -1.60 2.83 -5.83 -0.88 -5.95 
 (0.44)*** (0.39)*** (0.57)*** (0.54)*** (0.64)*** (0.56)*** (0.75) (0.69)*** 
PISEI  3.21 6.19 2.34  2.57 5.10 1.11 
  (0.09)*** (0.50)*** (0.47)***  (0.09)*** (0.69)*** (0.65)* 
Turk 1st * PISEI   -0.76 2.04   -1.51 0.28 
   (1.44) (1.30)   (1.96) (1.87) 
Turk 2nd * PISEI   -4.12 -1.11   -3.21 -0.20 
   (1.63)** (1.46)   (2.00) (1.82) 
WE Natives * PISEI   -0.68 0.89   -0.39 1.50 
   (0.51) (0.48)*   (0.70) (0.66)** 
EDUC  8.34  7.89  7.76  9.54 
  (0.09)***  (0.33)***  (0.09)***  (0.46)*** 
Turk 1st * EDUC    -3.29    -3.88 
    (1.04)***    (1.61)** 
Turk 2nd * EDUC    -1.51    -3.41 
    (1.39)    (1.44)** 
WE Natives * EDUC    0.55    -1.83 
    (0.34)    (0.47)*** 
Age 0.13 0.21 0.22 0.21 -0.01 0.11 0.06 0.11 
 (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01) (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
Adj. R2 0.03 0.32 0.13 0.32 0.00 0.26 0.08 0.26 
N 29137 29137 29137 29137 28915 28915 28915 28915 
1 The values are B-coefficients (SE) from OLS regressions. EDUC and PISEI are z-scores and AGE centered at 35.  
*** p-value<0.01 ** p-value<0.05 * p-value<0.10. 
2 The constant refers to Turks in Turkey in EVS. 
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Table 4 shows first generation Turks have significantly higher levels of education than 
Turks in Turkey (the reference group in all models) (Models 1a and 1b, Table 4); this difference 
remains statistically significant even after controlling for parental background (Models 2a and 
2b). Although we do not focus on educational outcomes of first generations in our theoretical 
background and hypotheses, it is interesting to note they are a positively selected group (Models 
2a and 2b) and are disadvantaged when compared to Western European natives. Models 3b adds 
an interaction between parental education and group; it reveals the education of first generation 
Turkish women depends less on their parents’ education (expressed by the negative interaction 
effect), than does the education of those remaining in Turkey. This leads to a relative advantage 
for the migrants when considering those with lower parental education (Figure 2b). The results 
show Turkey is a much less mobile society in terms of education than Western European 
countries: the steeper line in Figures 2a and 2b reveals the education of individuals depends 
more on their parents’ education. 
Following the first generation into the Western European labour market (Table 5), we 
find first generation Turkish women have lower occupational attainment than Turks in Turkey 
and Western European natives, while men are only disadvantaged with respect to the latter 
(Models 1a and 1b). After controlling for background characteristics (education plays the major 
role), the effect for first generation Turkish men becomes significantly negative, denoting a 
disadvantage with respect to Turks in Turkey; a similar effect is seen for women, but they 
experience a larger disadvantage in general. Note the change in the effect for Western European 
natives (from positive to negative) implying that, given equal background conditions (again the 
effect is driven by education), a higher occupation is obtained in Turkey. This makes the 
difference between first generation Turks and Turks in Turkey larger than the difference 
between the former and Western European natives (Models 2a and 2b). 
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For social reproduction processes (see interaction effects between parental occupation 
and group in Models 3a and 3b), we do not find statistically significant results, although the 
negative interaction effect points to a lower dependence of first generation Turks on parental 
occupation than Turks in Turkey. This is mainly driven by lower returns to education (see 
interaction effects between education and group in Models 4a and 4b) – as partially expected in 
hypothesis 1 – for first generation Turks compared to Western European natives and Turks in 
Turkey, particularly for women (returns to education are the highest in Turkey). These results 
are better observed in Figures 3a and 3b. Here we see the higher the educational level, the higher 
the difference between first generation Turks and Turks in Turkey. For example, the prediction 
for men with 12 years of education is 39 ISEI points for first generation Turks and 42 ISEI 
points for Turks in Turkey; this 3-point difference rises to 6 points for individuals with 15 years 
of education. Figure 3b also shows gaps are larger among women: comparisons of individuals 
with 12 years of education show a gap of 12 points in ISEI; the gap for 15 years of education is 
15. However, fewer women have (or have had) a job in Turkey, pointing to possible selection 
mechanisms for this group. 
Thus, on average, migration to Europe has not given an occupational advantage to most 
first generation Turks over those left behind. Although we do not find a weaker direct effect of 
parental background on occupations (OD), we find (hypothesis 1) both men and women 
experience lower returns to education (ED) in the destination countries, making those with 
relatively higher education more disadvantaged compared to Turks in Turkey and Western 
European natives. The gap is even larger when comparing first generation women with their 
counterparts in Turkey, suggesting differences in Western European and Turkish labour markets 
in terms of the value of education (the disadvantage practically disappears for lower educated 
men). 
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Moving to the second generation Turks, Table 4 shows, on average (after controlling for 
age), second generation Turkish men and women are more educated than their counterparts in 
Turkey but less educated than Western European natives (Models 1a and 1b). When controlling 
for parental education and occupation (Models 2a and 2b), differences from Western European 
natives vanish for men, but remain statistically significant for women, although differences 
between the genders in educational achievement are neither large nor statistically significant 
(tests available upon request). Meanwhile, the positive difference with Turks in Turkey remains. 
Models 3a and 3b show second generation Turks are more educationally mobile than Turks in 
Turkey (and compared to Western European natives). Going to Figures 2a and 2b, we observe 
men and women who have parents with lower educational levels (the majority of Turks in 
Western Europe) are particularly advantaged. For example, while the predicted education for a 
male Turk in Turkey with parents averaging 6 years of education is 10 years of education, for a 
second generation Turk, it is 12. Women are similarly advantaged among those with higher 
educational levels. This result confirms hypothesis 2a: the majority of second generation Turks 
are doing better in terms of education than Turks in Turkey, with a weaker parental effect on 
education (OE) the main driver. 
In Table 5, Models 1a and 1b (which only control for age) show, on average, the 
occupational status of the second generation has improved compared to the first generation, 
likely related to their educational improvements in the destination country. When we compare 
them to Turks in Turkey, we observe an advantage for men. Nevertheless, the status of the 
second generation remains lower than among Western European natives. After controlling 
education and parental background (Models 2a and 2b), similarly to what was observed for the 
first generation, second generation Turks are now disadvantaged with respect to Turks in 
Turkey. At the same time, differences with Western European natives vanish.11 In other words, 
                                                 
11 Previous studies (see Heath and Cheung 2007) find ethnic penalties for second generation Turks in access to the 
service class. We calculate this for the five ESS rounds/years (see footnote 2); when controlling for age and 
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although second generation Turks may have improved their situation in the destination country, 
under equal conditions, they may have had a better occupational status in Turkey. 
For occupational mobility, Models 3a and 3b of Table 5 show the total contribution of 
parental occupation, before the mediation of the level of education. For second generation 
Turks, the parental background is much less important in determining occupational 
achievements than for Turks in Turkey or for Western European natives. This can be seen in the 
negative – and substantive – interaction coefficients for this group (although for women 
differences are not statistically significant). When education is added (Models 4a and 4b), the 
difference in the effect of parental occupation reduces substantially for both genders, showing 
the strong mediating role of education in intergeneration reproduction; however, it becomes 
statistically non-significant, not giving good evidence of hypothesis 2b. Looking at the returns 
to education, we see the effect of education is smaller for second generation Turks than for 
Turks in Turkey, although results are statistically significant only for women. When these 
results are plotted in Figure 3, both men and women, particularly the latter, are more 
disadvantaged with respect to Turks in Turkey (and to Western European natives) at higher 
educational levels. For example, while among women with 12 years of education the gap 
between second generation Turkish women and women in Turkey is 4 points in ISEI in favour 
of the latter, among those with 15 years of education the gap jumps to 7.  
All in all, the second generation is doing better than the first generation in terms of 
occupation and is integrating into the European labour market. These Turks are much less 
dependent on their parents’ background, especially in terms of education (OE), allowing them 
to reach higher educational levels and get better jobs. Migration, thus, gives an initial advantage 
                                                 
education, there is a significant negative effect for second generation Turks compared to native Western Europeans 
(pooled men and women). The same model for ISEI shows a negative but non-significant effect; thus, the study of 
‘ethnic penalties’ based on ISEI draws a more favourable picture of second generation Turks in Western Europe 
than studies based on access to the service class. When the class of origin is introduced in both models, the negative 
effect disappears, showing the relatively lower parental background of second generation Turks helps explain 
differences with natives (see Zuccotti 2015b for a discussion on this).  
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to the descendants of those with lower social backgrounds, since the children can separate their 
outcomes from their origins. This general advantage in terms of occupation vanishes once we 
control for education. In fact, in Turkey, education has an overall greater value when accessing 
occupations, compared to Western Europe.12 Consequently, even if second generation Turks are 
not disadvantaged with respect to Western European natives in equality of education, they have 
lower occupational statuses than Turks in Turkey, on average. For women, there are higher 
returns to education (ED) in Turkey, compared to both Western European natives and second 
generation Turks; this increases the gap among the higher educated. A similar pattern is 
observed for first generation women (remember, however, working women in Turkey are a 
much more selective group).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 This is an average Western European effect. Note: it is mainly driven by Germany, the country with the most 
Turks. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
Many studies on migrants’ integration in Western Europe look for evidence of ‘ethnic penalties’ 
by comparing migrants with native populations in various outcomes, including education and 
occupation. We select an alternative perspective, focusing on social origins and looking at those 
left behind. Improving with respect to parents and to those remaining in the origin country is, 
we believe, a priority for migrants who move for economic reasons. This perspective also allows 
a counterfactual question: what would have happened to migrants and their offspring had they 
decided to stay? Main findings are summarized in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Summary of findings 
Generation 
Outcome 
studied 
Main findings 
First Occupation 
First generation Turks in Western Europe are 
disadvantaged in terms of occupation with respect to 
Turks in Turkey, and this is especially strong among the 
higher educated, as expected from Hypothesis 1: for 
Turks in Turkey (as for WE natives), education has a 
greater value in the labour market.  
Second 
Education 
Second generation Turks in Western Europe reach 
higher educational levels as compared to those left 
behind; this is thanks to higher (upward) educational 
mobility, as expected from Hypothesis 2a. 
Occupation 
Second generation Turks in Western Europe are 
disadvantaged in terms of occupation with respect to 
Turks in Turkey, in particular highly educated women; 
this is mainly because in Turkey education has a greater 
value in the labour market. We do not find strong 
evidence of lower OD effect, as expected from 
Hypothesis 2b.  
 
Overall, for first generation Turks, migration has led to lower occupational status than 
they would have obtained in Turkey. Their poor performance in the destination countries is no 
surprise; economic gains, mainly in terms of money, are an important part of the motivation to 
move, but this often implies sacrifices in occupational status. Their lower returns to education 
as compared to those of Turks in Turkey and Western European natives (hypothesis 1) might 
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indicate a lack of recognition of their educational credentials, along with discrimination and 
difficulties in the labour market. Moreover, the difference between first generation Turks and 
Turks in Turkey is amplified by characteristics of the Turkish labour market itself. On the one 
hand, given equal education and parental background, in Turkey it is possible to attain higher 
occupations than in Western Europe, on average. On the other hand, but only for women, returns 
to education are higher in Turkey (although women are much less likely to have an occupation 
in Turkey).  
Outcomes for the second generation suggest longer-term consequences of migration and 
help to disentangle the counterfactual perspective. Here, the comparisons with Turks in Turkey 
suggest the migration project has mixed results. The second generation is more successful than 
its Turkish counterparts in educational achievement, mainly driven by a lower dependence on 
parental education (hypothesis 2a), leading Turks from low class backgrounds (the majority in 
Western Europe) to achieve higher education status in Western Europe than in Turkey. This 
finding supports the classic suggestion that migrants are motivated to achieve a better life for 
themselves and their children. The second generation Turks in Europe might also have 
benefitted from richer cultural capital and gained from educational expansion in European 
countries since the 1960s, though a similar but slower progress has been taking place in Turkey 
since 1980 (OECD 2012). Nevertheless, educational expansion does not necessarily generate 
social mobility in a society; further research is required.   
For occupation, on average, second generation Turks are doing better than the first 
generation and better than Turks in Turkey. However, the advantage over those left behind 
reverses once education is taken into account, mostly because the value of education in Western 
European and Turkish labour markets varies: specifically, given a certain education, an 
individual gets higher occupational status in Turkey than in Western Europe. For second 
generation women, the disadvantage with respect to those left behind is amplified by the 
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existence of higher returns to education in Turkey. Summing up, even though the majority of 
second generation Turks do not suffer ‘ethnic penalties’, they cannot reach the same 
occupational levels as their counterparts back home. Note: we do not find strong evidence of a 
lower parental direct effect on occupation for second generation (hypothesis 2b). 
Has migration to Western Europe been beneficial for Turks? We are inclined to say yes. 
The possibility of the children of low class Turkish migrants acquiring a relatively higher 
education and converting this education in the labour market represents a positive outcome. 
Although in Turkey, given the equality of parental occupation and education, the occupational 
status is higher on average (particularly for highly educated women), the possibility of a child 
with a low class background reaching a higher occupational status through education, thus 
differentiating him/her from his/her parents, is less likely. Furthermore, among women, there is 
a gain in access to the labour market. That said, research shows educational outcomes of second 
generation Turks vary in different European destination countries (Crul and Schneider 2010), 
possibly having differential impacts on their labour market careers across European destination 
countries. Therefore, although educational mobility, the main driving force of the benefits of 
migration, is a pattern we find for Turks in most Western European countries, more country-
specific analyses would illuminate the extent of the advantages and disadvantages of migration.  
Our novel origin-country perspective compares migrants and their offspring with their 
counterparts who stayed in Turkey. The approach has much to offer to international migration 
studies. For example, researchers can trace the influence of migration on family processes, 
friendships and networks, cultural, religious and political behaviour, values and lifestyles, health 
and wellbeing. Notably, the perspective answers recent calls to avoid methodological 
nationalism in international migration studies and to search for mechanisms behind migration 
processes and their impact on the whereabouts of migrants and their descendants, rather than 
aiming to answer policy driven research questions of the destination country nations (Amelina 
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and Faist 2012; Guveli 2015; Guveli, et al. 2015). We expect our work will trigger further 
research on other aspects of integration, and we anticipate a more complete understanding of 
the penalties and benefits of migration.  
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